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PREFACE
It is my pleasure to present our report Blue Peace for the Nile. Strategic Foresight Group has been engaged 
with trans-boundary water issues since 2008 in Asia and the Middle East. With this report, we extend our 
work to Africa.
The Blue Peace approach advocates collaborative, comprehensive and sustainable solutions to trans-
boundary water issues. It promotes engagement of mainstream decision makers and national leaders 
to address the water issue, going beyond the conventional approach over dependence on the domain 
ministries. It also explores how water can be used as an instrument for peace.
The countries of the Nile Basin have made commendable progress in regional cooperation under the 
auspices of the Nile Basin Initiative. They have also encountered difficulties and differences of opinion on 
some of the key legal and political issues. We hope that the recommendations made in this report will 
help strengthen institutional cooperation, overcome political and legal hurdles and build on technical 
cooperation.
This report has been possible with support from the Government of Switzerland, and particularly the 
Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation (SDC) as well as the Political Directorate of the Federal 
Department of Foreign Affairs. We appreciate their cooperation in co-hosting a high level workshop in 
Zurich in February 2012, with senior government officials, parliamentarians and experts participating from 
Burundi, Rwanda, Kenya, Uganda, Tanzania, Sudan, South Sudan, Ethiopia and Egypt. We have also gained 
from insights and information shared by a large number of experts and officials in Kenya, Uganda, Tanzania, 
Rwanda, and Egypt in their interaction with the teams of Strategic Foresight Group during visits to these 
countries for field research. We had enriching discussions with officials of Burundi, Ethiopia, and Sudan at 
the World Water Forum in Marseilles, France, in March 2012 and Africa Water Week in Cairo in May 2012 
as visits to these countries were not possible. We wish to express our appreciation to Hon. Charity Ngilu, 
Kenya’s Minister for Water Resources and Chair of Nile-COM until July 2012, as well as the officials of the 
Nile Basin Initiative Secretariat for their ideas and interaction. However, the analysis and views expressed 
in this report are only of the Strategic Foresight Group. They do not in anyway represent the views of the 
Government of Swisserland or any of the governments in the Nile basin.
The report is thus a result of a comprehensive international effort, primarily with input from the Nile Basin 
countries. It presents an overview of challenges from a futuristic perspective. Much has been published 
about the past and present situation in the Nile Basin. However, it is important to examine trends and 
discontinuities for the next 40-50 years. It is an insight into the future that will help us to prepare policy 
options.
The recommendations are divided into political and technical components. While we appreciate the 
groundwork laid by the Nile Basin Initiative in technical areas, a more comprehensive approach is required 
for institutionalising political cooperation. It is essential to create an institutional architecture which can 
address the current political differences and prevent future political problems. Since the future of the 
Nile is not only about water but also about climate, food, health, electricity, social stability and national 
security of all countries in the basin, it is important to engage Heads of Government in leading the process 
of cooperation. The report calls for an urgent and informal retreat of Nile Ministers of Foreign Affairs and 
Water Resources at a neutral location outside the Nile Basin to examine our recommendations.
We hope that such an informal retreat will take place soon in 2013, International Year for Water 
Cooperation, and that our analysis and recommendations will contribute to a constructive policy discourse 
in the region making greater cooperation feasible.
Sundeep Waslekar 
President 
Strategic Foresight Group
Mumbai, March 2013
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The people of Rwanda, Burundi, Tanzania, Kenya, 
Democratic Republic of Congo, Uganda, Eritrea, 
Ethiopia, South Sudan, Sudan, and Egypt to varying 
degrees depend on the Nile River. The Nile River 
system has the White Nile originating in Lake Victoria 
in the South, or in Burundi if rivers that feed into 
Lake Victoria are taken into account; and the Blue 
Nile which originates mainly in Ethiopia. The two 
Nile Rivers merge near Khartoum in Sudan and enter 
Egypt as one river. The term Nile is therefore used to 
encompass the entire Nile system, including White 
Nile, Blue Nile (also known as the Eastern Nile) and 
tributaries, unless otherwise specified.
The flows of the River Nile as measured at Aswan on 
the border of Sudan and Egypt experience very high 
degree of fluctuations, rendering the management 
of trans-boundary water very difficult.
Oscillations in Nile Flow
47 BCM
117 BCM
1965 - 2010 2015 - 2065
Standard 
Flow
84 BCM
In the last 150 years, the lowest recorded flow at 
Aswan was 42 BCM (1913-14) and the highest was 
150 BCM (1878-79), whereas the mean annual flow 
from 1900 to 2004 was 85.31 BCM. The flow has 
oscillated between 117 BCM to under 50 BCM in the 
half century from 1960 to 2010.
The fluctuations in the flow of watercourses are 
likely to increase in the twenty first century. The Nile 
river basin is witnessing a change in rainfall patterns 
with changes in seasonal periods, and shorter bursts 
of intense rains that are too rapid for agricultural 
growth. Climate change models predict increase or 
decrease of 15-20 per cent precipitation on an annual 
basis. However, most models concur that irrespective 
of the overall annual quantum, erratic patterns of 
rainfall and concentration over fewer days would 
affect productivity of agriculture. If the experience of 
Ethiopia, Kenya and Sudan in recent years is used as 
a basis, and also if experience from other developing 
countries is considered, depletion of water resources 
during relevant seasons for agriculture can lead to a 
decline in yield by up to 50 per cent.
It is expected that temperature across the Nile Basin 
will increase by 1.5 – 2.1 per cent by 2050. Almost 
the entire Nile region may become arid to semi-
arid in the next 30-40 years which will significantly 
reduce agricultural land. 
Most of equatorial Kenya is getting drier since 1962. 
From 1960 to 2000, droughts have been witnessed 
every 2 to 3 years. Since the 1990s prolonged 
droughts exceeding five years have occurred regularly. 
The pattern in the last few decades clearly shows 
the gradual expansion of arid and semi-arid area 
initially surrounding the Nile Basin and eventually 
encroaching upon the basin itself. The continuation of 
this trend is bound to lead to the narrowing of fertile 
area. It will be increasingly confined close to the 
banks of the river with much of the remaining basin 
turning into an arid or semi-arid zone. The expansion 
of arid and semi-arid areas is concurrent with rise in 
temperature, which leads to increase in water need 
of crops, thereby effectively bringing down the crop 
yield per acre.
Floods and droughts have caused immense damage to 
the Nile River basin countries both in terms of people 
Overview
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affected as well as economic damage. Between 1900 
and 2012, there have been almost 140 incidents 
of floods in the Nile Basin. More than 100 of them 
occurred in Ethiopia, Sudan, South Sudan, Kenya and 
Tanzania. During this period, more than 10 million 
people living in the Nile basin were affected by floods 
with around 4000 casualties.  
Droughts in the Nile River Basin have proved to be 
even more fatal than the floods. Between 1900 and 
2012, there were almost 70 incidents of drought. Out 
of them about 55 incidents took place in Ethiopia, 
Sudan, South Sudan, Kenya and Tanzania. Around 170 
million people have been affected by droughts in the 
last century with half a million lives lost. 
From 1970 to 2004, Tanzania, Kenya, Sudan, South 
Sudan, Ethiopia have had more than 10 droughts; 
Uganda has had 6-9 droughts; and Rwanda and 
Burundi have had 3-5 droughts.
The experience of the last 30 years indicates that the 
five countries have greatest exposure to risks from 
floods and droughts in the next 30-40 years as well.
The Nile Basin is suffering from land degradation on 
account of deforestation, urbanisation, and over 
grazing. It results in
Soil Erosion and Sedimentation:  Due to its 
topography and torrential rainfall, the Blue Nile 
catchment faces high rates of sedimentation as 
compared to the White Nile, whose sedimentation 
is largely retained in the Equatorial Lakes and 
the Sudd region. While the Nile catchment’s 
Precipitation/ Runoff ratio is estimated at a low 
rate of 5.5%, the ratio of the Blue Nile catchment 
on its own is 20%. Sedimentation has a negative 
effect on reservoirs built along the Nile River Basin. 
It clogs the area thereby reducing the amount of 
water that is to be stored.  
Desertification: Desertification threatens 40 
to 80 per cent territories of countries in the 
basin. While it is difficult to specify the precise 
year, sometime in the course of the twenty first 
century, this risk is set to threaten transformation 
of the Nile countries into arid and semi-arid 
countries. The countries facing maximum risk of 
desertification are Ethiopia, Kenya and Sudan, 
some of the same countries that face the twin 
challenges of floods and droughts.
Climate Change in the Nile River Basin
Temperate
Equatorial
Tropical Savanna Grasslands
Arid and Semi-arid
Extreme Hot Desert
2007 2040
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Sand Encroachments: Instances of sand 
encroachment in Sudan are increasing, whereby 
the entire strip of the country along the Nile 
especially between Delgo and Karima in 
northern Sudan is threatened by it. Sand dunes 
on the eastern bank of River Nile in Sudan and 
encroachments in north-central regions can 
threaten the river’s course. Sand encroachment 
is also affecting the productivity of soil which has 
been witnessed extensively in the Gezira scheme 
and also in some areas of North Kordofan, North 
Darfur and Kannar in the Northern State of Sudan. 
In the Dongola-Merowe region of Sudan, the area 
covered by sand dunes increased from 51.2 km2 to 
61.2 km2 between 1976 and 1996 and decreased 
to 35.1 km2 in 2000. This decrease could be 
attributed to an increase in the area covered by 
gravel and/or coarse sand. In Egypt, active sand 
dunes and encroachments occupy more than 16.6 
per cent of the country’s total land area. Sand 
encroachment in Egypt is further enhanced by the 
erratic rainfall, active winds, and scarcity of plant 
cover. Some inactive sand accumulations have 
been noticed in the eastern side of the Nile delta 
and in the Sinai Peninsula.
While factors discussed earlier are bound to affect 
the availability of fresh water in quantitative terms, 
each and every country in the Nile Basin faces severe 
challenge with regards to deterioration of the quality 
of water, growing pollution, in some cases spread 
of water hyacinth, with implications for health and 
development.
The capacity for monitoring water quality is grossly 
inadequate across the basin, with some variation 
between countries, due to shortage of laboratories, 
shortage of equipment, trained personnel and 
testing facilities for all relevant parameters and 
absence of clear legal frameworks. While this is the 
situation within countries, it is not clear how trans-
boundary flow of pollutants and the process of quality 
deterioration can be managed.
The crisis of climate, water flows and water quality 
have combined to result in the weakening of food 
security in the region.
Beans, maize, millet and sorghum are produced 
locally and exported to countries within the basin. 
Uganda, Ethiopia and Tanzania are the largest regional 
exporters of food staples. Sudan, Kenya and Egypt 
are the largest importers of food in the region from 
regional, as well as international sources. Wheat, 
palm oil and sugar are the top imported food crops in 
the Nile Basin countries whereas coffee, tea, tobacco 
are the main exports for all countries, except Sudan 
and Egypt. Egypt mainly exports oranges and rice, 
whereas Sudan exports sesame seeds and cotton. 
Countries Severely hit by Flood and Drought between 1900 and 2012
Total 140 incidents Total 70 incidents
Floods Drought
Ethiopia
Kenya
Sudan
South Sudan
Tanzania
Other Countries
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The source of imports and destination of exports is 
predominantly outside the basin. Wheat imports 
are mainly sourced from Russia, Ukraine, Argentina 
and USA to the Nile basin countries, whereas maize 
is sourced from India and palm oil from Indonesia 
and Malaysia. Egypt and Sudan mainly export their 
produce to Asia and the Middle East and also to 
Europe and North America in smaller quantities. 
Uganda mainly exports to the European Union. 
Food deficit within the basin has created need 
for food aid. Over 35 per cent of the population in 
Rwanda, Burundi and Ethiopia is food insecure and 
depends on food aid. About 25 per cent of Kenyans 
and Tanzanians lack adequate access to food and 
risk dependence on external aid. Conflict ridden 
Sudan and South Sudan’s food insecurity is unclear 
although it is estimated that the vast majority of 
the population, especially in western and central 
Sudan and along the disputed new borders are food 
insecure. Egypt has been receiving subsidised food 
grains as a part of its bilateral security relationship 
with the United States.
Food insecurity is expected to increase in the next 
30-40 years due to drop in agricultural productivity 
by up to 50 per cent, which is expected to be caused 
by rising temperature, climate change, drought and 
reduction in rainy season to narrow and intense 
period (irrespective of whatever happens to the 
annual average precipitation levels). This can also 
lead to drop in food production by 30 to 50 per cent. 
During the same period, population of the Nile Basin 
will double. Therefore, per capital food availability can 
decline substantially, creating need for food imports 
and food aid.
Increasing Food Insecurity
2010
232
100%
60%
377
2030
While some countries in the Nile Basin depend on 
food aid from foreign countries, they have been 
offering their land at extremely low rates and 
water almost free to foreign investors for export of 
agricultural produce. Thus, the water of Nile River 
is exported in virtual terms and used for other 
countries outside the basin, while the people in the 
basin face food insecurity.
In order to improve food security, the countries in 
the region will need to improve farm productivity 
and expand irrigation, including drip irrigation, on a 
large scale. There is potential for increasing irrigated 
area by almost 7-8 million hectares in upper riparian 
countries. But it will require financial resources to 
the tune of US$ 50 billion. Most of this requirement 
Deterioration of Water Quality in the Nile
Discharge of 
municipal waste
Release of
industrial pollutants
Discharge of metals   
in mining areas Animal waste
Water hyacinth
Blue Peace for the Nile 5
will be in the upper riparian countries.
Besides food insecurity, Nile countries also suffer 
from energy insecurity. As a result of extremely low 
electrification rates with the exception of Egypt, 
over 80 per cent of the region’s population relies 
on traditional methods of fuel, firewood, charcoal, 
certain crops or manure.
The Nile countries plan to install additional capacity of 
at least 30,000-35,000 MW over the next 20-30 years, 
for domestic consumption and exports. Ethiopia 
alone accounts for 50-60 per cent of this projected 
expansion. The cumulative cost of investment in 
power sector for the Nile countries is expected to be 
US$ 60 billion, inclusive of direct and indirect costs.
A US$ 30 billion bill for Ethiopia alone is almost 
equivalent to its GDP for the year 2011. With per 
capita income under 400 dollars (barely dollar a day 
income) and government budgetary outlay of US$ 
4 billion, there are fiscal and economic limitations 
on the country’s ability to raise resources from 
within. According to some media reports, Ethiopia 
can fund about 20 per cent of the cost of the Grand 
Renaissance and other dam projects. It has to depend 
on other sources, including China, multilateral 
organisations and donor funds for 80 per cent of the 
financial requirements.
The other countries in the Nile basin will have to 
budget around US$ 1 billion annually. For many 
of these countries, this exceeds their total annual 
expenditure (as per 2010 budget) and will put them 
in further debt. For example Uganda, which has 
some of the largest future plans had total budget 
outlay of US$ 2.75 billion in 2010. Tanzania which has 
planned for over 20 Hydro power projects saw a 2010 
expenditure of US$ 5.21 billion. These costs do not 
include the current and future regional plans to build 
grids and regional power lines. 
Besides financial costs, there are also social and 
economic consequences of large dams. There are 
questions of settlement of affected population and 
respect for their human rights. Overall, the challenge 
of energy security is a compound challenge of power 
production, mobilising financial resources and 
addressing socio-economic issues of population in 
affected areas.
At a time when the Nile Basin countries are 
facing critical challenges for their future, they are 
involved in a legal and political discord on the 
proposed Comprehensive Framework Agreement for 
cooperation in the basin, and particularly its proposed 
Article 14 (b). While the CFA was drafted in 2010, 
there is a long history of negotiations and treaties 
77
10,000
1,220
478
119
354
International Comparison of Access to Electricity
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involving the Nile Basin countries. The legal history 
can be traced to the 1902 agreement on the Nile 
between the then colonial powers. Since then Egypt 
and Ethiopia have negotiated and signed agreements 
on the flow of the Nile. The most significant of them 
is the 1993 treaty signed by the heads of the two 
governments and deposited with the UN. It would be 
useful to see how this bilateral treaty relates to the 
multilateral CFA. The formation of South Sudan as a 
sovereign state may add another element to the legal 
challenges. The differences over legal and political 
issues threaten the political unity of the basin, with 
a risk of undermining confidence of the international 
aid and investment community in the basin. More 
significantly, it poses the risk of depriving people of 
the basin of the opportunity to live and grow in peace 
and harmony, achieving economic development and 
realising their full potential.
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Summary of Recommendations
Premise: Political unity of the Nile Basin should be 
achieved and fostered through the benefit sharing 
approach.
The Nile Basin Initiative represents a highly successful 
mechanism to promote technical cooperation 
between the Nile Basin riparian countries. However, 
it has been facing a political deadlock over the 
finalisation of the Comprehensive Framework 
Agreement (CFA) and in particular Article 14 (b) about 
the competing rights of riparian countries to use the 
trans-boundary water. 
The governments of all Nile countries have expressed 
desire to work together and achieve political unity of 
the basin. This sentiment was evident in statements 
made by ministers attending the meeting of the Nile 
Council of Ministers (Nile-COM) in July 2012 at Kigali, 
Rwanda. Here, the term ‘political unity’ represents 
integrity of the Nile Basin as one basin with all riparian 
countries being members of a basin organisation as 
sovereign states. 
Any way forward has to be based on the principle 
of cooperation and benefit sharing among all the 
countries that presently constitute the Nile Basin. The 
division of the Nile basin into White Nile and Blue Nile 
(Eastern Nile) sub-basins is not an effective option 
since the political deadlock is primarily between 
members of the Blue Nile basin countries. There can 
be separate organizations of White and a Blue Nile 
area, for promoting certain development projects, 
as the NBI already has through its two subsidiary 
action programmes. However, separate organization 
of technical projects should not be confused with the 
issue of political unity of the Nile Basin. 
The enforcement of the CFA in the area under 
jurisdiction of present signatories is also not an 
effective option, since more than 70 per cent basin 
area, and more than 50 per cent of basin population 
would be out of the scope of such an arrangement. 
In other words, as the present 6 signatory countries 
of the CFA account for less than one third of the basin 
geography and less than half of the basin population, 
an arrangement confined to them would result in the 
Nile Basin being truncated to a small and unviable 
size of its real self. Therefore, while the process of 
CFA endorsement goes on, as desired by the present 
signatories, it is also important to find various 
mechanisms which can ensure political unity of the 
Nile Basin. 
The Nile Basin countries require in excess of US$ 100 
billion for the development of hydro-electricity (US$ 
60-65 billion), irrigation (US$ 50 billion) and water 
infrastructure (estimates not available) over the next 
20-25 years or almost US$ 3-4 billion per year. (Since 
estimates of projected expenditure will have some 
overlap, the total of US$ 100 billion is less than the 
sum of its parts.) More than 70 per cent of these 
financial resources are required by 6 countries that 
are the present signatories to the CFA. As economies 
of most Nile countries are weak as demonstrated 
in low per capita income, poor infrastructure and 
undeveloped private sector, they substantially 
depend on external donors, including both traditional 
and newly emerging donors, and multilateral 
organisations to raise US$ 100 billion for energy, 
water and food sector, which would be in addition 
to other human needs such as health and education. 
It would be impossible to raise these funds from 
multilateral organisations in the absence of political 
unity of the basin and guarantee of trans-boundary 
environmental impact and techno-economic 
assessments that political unity can deliver. It is 
possible to raise some funds from newly emerging 
donors from Asia, but it is known that Asian 
investments have their own limits and are linked to 
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specific quid pro quo. Therefore it would be difficult 
to expect to raise US$ 100 billion for water, food and 
energy sectors. If Nile Basin countries wish to bring 
about socio-economic development, they have to be 
in a position to attract international funding, which 
would be only possible if there is the context of 
harmony. 
There is a fresh opportunity for achieving political 
unity since new governments are taking power in 
Egypt and Ethiopia, the two main parties, at the time 
of publishing this report. The process of internal 
political consolidation, which began in 2012 in the 
two countries, will go on through 2013. This offers 
a window of opportunity for the new governments 
to explore new and renewed ideas to lead all basin 
countries onto a path of cooperation. In October 
2012, Egypt sent a large delegation of NGOs to 
Ethiopia and other riparian countries to initiate a new 
process of building good will. The efforts to reactivate 
ENTRO is also a positive development.
This report proposes several mechanisms to achieve 
and enhance regional cooperation with benefit 
sharing approach in the Nile Basin and also to 
improve domestic governance, efficiency and demand 
and supply variables within each of the Nile countries. 
Component A- Regional Cooperation
Informal Meeting of the Nile Ministers of Foreign 1. 
Affairs and Water
Several proposals made here are politically 
challenging. They have potential for huge benefits, but 
also require high degree of political understanding and 
compromise. This can be best done in an informal 
meeting of Ministers of Foreign Affairs and Ministers 
of Water and Irrigation of all Nile countries. The 
meeting should be an informal gathering or a retreat 
and the venue could be outside of the Nile basin. In 
a formal meeting, the ministers are bound to present 
the positions of their countries and there is less 
flexibility. They are usually accompanied by senior 
civil service officers and they present positions which 
are prepared by these civil servants. In an informal 
meeting there is a lot of flexibility. Ministers can 
interact with each other in an open manner without 
conventional constraints. They can have discussions 
without being bound by treaty obligations. This 
makes it possible to reach common ground. It is also 
important that the participants in this meeting are 
not merely Ministers of Water and Irrigation but also 
Ministers of Foreign Affairs, since the latter seem to 
command greater political authority in Nile countries 
than their counterparts in Water Ministries. As 
Ministers of Foreign Affairs have a wider perspective 
of political, economic and social issues, they are in a 
much better position to form a view on ideas that can 
change dynamics on the basis of a common position. 
However, it is also important that the Ministers of 
Water and Irrigation are part of this retreat since they 
have domain authority. 
Once a common position is identified, the ministers 
can channelize it into official processes and convert 
it into an intergovernmental treaty or a MoU. Or they 
may choose to recommend a summit of Heads of 
Government to take a final decision on their proposals. 
This method of informal interaction has been used 
by several countries around the world to resolve 
disputes in difficult situations. It is recommended that 
the leaders of the Nile Basin Countries consider this 
approach to examine proposals put forward in this 
report.
High Strategic Council should be established to 2. 
address core issues and a Committee of Legal 
Experts reporting to the High Strategic Council 
should be established to address outstanding or 
ambiguous legal issues.
First, it is recommended that a High Strategic 
Council should be established to address difficult 
but significant issues which are core to the future 
of the Nile Basin. The Council should be at the level 
of Heads of Government and meet once a year. The 
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New Architecture for the Nile Basin
Technical Cooperation      Comprehensive Cooperation 
Comprehensive Cooperation = Political + Legal + Technical + People to People Cooperation
High Strategic Council
Current Architecture
Proposed Architecture
Foreign Ministers / Special Envoys
Mechanism for
Groundwater Issues
Nile Media Network
Nile COM
Nile TAC
Nile Parliamentarian Network
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Heads of Government should designate either Foreign 
Ministers or Special Envoys to meet during the year, as 
and when needed. The High Strategic Council should 
receive political input from the Nile Parliamentary 
Forum with the latter being restructured as explained 
in Recommendation 5. The High Strategic Council 
should receive specialised legal input from the 
Committee of Legal Experts on outstanding and 
ambiguous legal issues (Recommendation 2.2) and 
Quality Coordination Committee (Recommendation 
3). The High Strategic Council should also receive 
input from the Nile Council of Ministers (Nile-COM) 
who in turn obtain support from Nile-TAC (Technical 
Advisory Committee) of the Nile Basin Initiative.
Second, it is recommended that an independent 
Committee of Legal Experts be established to consider 
and clarify the following and similar legal instruments 
with a view to remove misunderstanding, ambiguity, 
conflict and to promote cooperation in a manner that 
will enable sustenance of Nile waters, socio economic 
development, and environmental sustainability of the 
basin:
Comprehensive Framework Agreement, which has 
been signed by 6 countries and not signed by 4 
countries due to discord over Article 14 (b).
The 1929 and 1959 Agreements on allocation of 
water share between Egypt and Sudan, which are 
not acceptable to other countries on the grounds 
that they were signed when the opponents to 
these treaties in the Nile Basin were colonized, and 
the application of these agreements to Republic of 
South Sudan  in the context of the laws on state 
succession 
Bilateral treaty between Egypt and Ethiopia, 
signed by Heads of States of two independent and 
sovereign states in 1993, who are main parties in 
the Nile dispute, and the question of how it relates 
to other treaties in the Nile basin
The application of the Convention on Biological 
Diversity (CBD) to the Nile Basin countries, and 
especially CBD signatories in the Nile Basin to 
examine impact and implications for ecology
The relevance of African Convention on the 
Conservation of Nature and other African 
continental, regional or sub-regional legal 
instruments such as COMESA and EAC instruments 
to the Nile basin countries.
Such an independent committee should be established 
by the mandate of the High Strategic Council, or even 
Nile-COM if the governments determine that it would 
be appropriate for such a Committee to precede the 
High Strategic Council for practical reasons. It should 
have members from the basin countries as well as 
independent international experts from outside 
the basin. It should have a definite but realistic time 
frame to produce its recommendations.
The Committee of Legal Experts should have two 
purposes. It should clarify the plethora of laws which 
can have implications for cooperation in the Nile 
Basin to propose legal instruments to advance basin-
wide cooperation on terms unanimously acceptable 
to all riparian countries. The Committee should also 
examine state compliance to the agreements or 
draft agreements which have been already signed by 
countries in the Nile Basin and recommend strategies 
for improving such state compliance.
Third, the governments of the Nile countries 
should begin informal consultations for alternative 
formulation of the disputed Article 14 (b) of the 
CFA. One formulation, had informal acceptance of 
all countries, without exception of any country in 
the basin whatsoever at the Nile-COM meeting in 
Bujumbura. It can be re-examined with a fresh conflict 
resolution approach.
“not to significantly harm current and future 
uses and rights and water security of any  other 
member states.” where water security is defined 
as “ the right of all Nile Basin States to reliable 
access to and use of the Nile River system for 
health, agriculture, livelihoods, production and 
environment.” (Article 2(f)).
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The inclusion of “current uses and rights” should 
address the needs of Egypt and Sudan. The use of 
“future uses and rights” should address the needs of 
the upper riparian countries, while recognising the 
future needs of the lower riparian countries as well.
If this precise formulation is not acceptable, it may be 
possible to craft another formulation either directly 
through informal consultations by the member 
countries or under the auspices of the Committee of 
Legal Experts proposed earlier. 
Fourth, the Nile countries should appoint a specific 
arbitration mechanism. The CFA does not provide for 
a specific arbitration mechanism, though its provisions 
for dispute resolution are based on the hypothesis 
that the member countries could appoint or approach 
an arbitration body. Such a vague provision can 
hinder resolution of disputes. There are two, among 
others, effective options for appointing an arbitration 
mechanism.
The World Bank, which has played critical role in 
the establishment of the Nile Basin Initiative, can 
be a designated arbitration mechanism. It may 
operate in ways similar to its arbitration services to 
the Indus Commission by receiving requests from 
member countries and appointing Neutral Experts 
or Arbitration Committees to address specific 
issues, as the case may be
If for some reason, the member countries do not 
want to depend on the World Bank alone for this 
purpose, they may appoint an Arbitration Quartet 
composed of The World Bank, UNDP, European 
Union and the African Development Bank (or the 
African Union). 
Fifth, the High Strategic Council can consider specific 
sub-regional legal and technical initiatives to address 
issues arising from specific projects. In 2012, Egypt, 
Ethiopia and Sudan established International Panel 
of Experts on Grand Renaissance Dam, also known as 
the Tripartite Committee of Experts. The Committee 
comprising of the three countries as well as 
independent external experts was expected to identify 
mutually beneficial options for the construction of the 
dam. In order for such a panel to function effectively 
and enable cooperation, it is essential that all parties 
give information in a transparent manner and uphold 
the principle of   mutual accountability. If the Grand 
Renaissance Dam Tripartite Committee succeeds in 
achieving results, based on transparency and mutual 
accountability, it could be a good example for similar 
Committees to be formed in future.
Coordination of policies on the quality of water 3. 
and ecological preservation of water resources 
and wetlands should be a priority.
Article 6 of the CFA proposes “protection and 
conservation of the Nile River Basin and its 
ecosystems” which includes improving the quality of 
water, protecting wetlands, saving biodiversity as well 
as restoration of depleted resources.  The Article also 
advocates harmonizing regional policies across the 
basin to achieve this end. It appears that all countries 
in the Basin have no problem with this Article. It is 
therefore recommended that practical measures 
should be adapted to implement ideas embodied in 
the Article in letter and spirit irrespective of the future 
of the CFA itself. These include: 
Co-ordination of policies related to managing eco-
systems: Harmonization of policies needs to take 
place at two levels. At the national level, individual 
countries need to streamline relationship between 
various ministries and departments responsible 
for the water quality issues. At the regional level, 
countries in the basin need to adjust their policies 
together as they are all dependent on the same 
water sources and their choices are bound to have 
impact on the entire basin.
Setting analogous targets: The Nile Basin countries 
need to identify similar ‘base line targets’ to 
achieve, in the context of water quality as well as 
protection of biodiversity.
Economic valuation of the biodiversity: It is difficult 
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but helpful to evaluate direct and indirect returns 
from protecting the eco-systems in monetary 
terms.
Polluters pay: The Nile River Basin countries need 
to pool internal and international funds to restore 
extremely depleted areas. Also, they need to lay a 
standard for industries in terms of pollution and 
periodically monitor it. The riparian states need to 
follow the ‘polluters pay’ scheme where industries 
which cause pollution beyond the permissible limit 
need to pay fines or restore the area themselves. 
The Nile Basin countries share similar water pollution 
issues, such as - oxygen demanding substances, 
improper sanitation, nutrient runoffs from agricultural 
activities, and industrial and mining related water 
contamination. In order to combat these problems, 
the following measures need to be introduced:
Monitoring of oxygen demanding substances, COD 
and BOD, which warm water and reduce water 
transparency, thus, undermining water quality as 
well as sediment loads in the catchment of Lake 
Victoria. Additionally, monitoring contaminants 
which have bio-accumulation effects in water 
bodies and affect trans-boundary water resources, 
including nitrates and phosphates
Chemical contaminants from industrial and mining 
activities need closer monitoring as high levels of 
heavy metal substances like mercury, cadmium, 
lead, copper, chromium among other chemicals 
are consumed by fish through irrigated water 
Point sites of pollution such as industrial units 
need mapping and monitoring using analogous 
terms of reference in all countries. 
Control of pesticides and fertilizer levels in water 
bodies is needed. The monitoring of nutrient 
runoffs can help curb water hyacinth without 
having to resort to pesticide use 
As recommended by NBI, regional laboratories 
can be used in the interim period until adequate 
water quality monitoring sites are developed in all 
countries 
Current initiatives for controlling water hyacinth 
in the Lake Victoria region should be expanded to 
cover as many relevant parts of the Nile Basin as 
possible.
It is recommended that a Quality Coordination 
Committee should be established to harmonise 
legislation, standards, and practices dealing with waste 
water treatment, water pollution and quality control. 
Such a mechanism should prepare dynamic inventory 
of pollutants in different parts of Nile and a public 
information and warning system. It is recommended 
that modern management techniques and 
technologies for the restoration of depleted water 
resources should be undertaken. It is further 
recommended that the Quality Coordination 
Committee should report to the High Strategic 
Council.
While negotiations in the Nile Basin are 4. 
focussed on surface water, it is necessary to craft 
agreements that can prevent future conflict over 
groundwater and also to manage the relationship 
between groundwater and surface water.
The Nile Basin is estimated to have groundwater 
reserves of 500 BCM. As of now, less than 5 per cent 
of the groundwater is utilised. However, there is an 
increasing trend of using groundwater by digging tube 
wells, shallow wells, and using pumps in some of the 
Nile Basin countries.
The need to address trans-boundary aquifers: Most 
of the countries get their groundwater through direct 
precipitation/rainfall to recharge their aquifers or from 
fossil waters stored in their deep aquifers and through 
seepage or interaction with surface water. These 
aquifers extend across various countries. Currently, 
there is no law governing groundwater, specifically 
for that which is derived from these shared aquifers. 
The CFA Article 2 clause (b) includes groundwater 
in its definition of Nile water resources. However 
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Transboundary Aquifers in the Nile River Basin Countries
Baggara Basin Sudd Basin Disa Sandstone Basin
Ogaden (Juba)
Kilimanjaro Aquifer Crystalline Aquifers
Karoo Sandstone
Kagera
Ruvumu
Coastal Marine 
Sedimentary Aquifers
Gedaref Basin Sedimentary Aquifers
Nubian Sandstone Basin
Precambrian Basement
Egypt
Sudan Ethopia
Central African
Republic
Eritrea Uganda
Mozambique
Somalia
DRC
*The Baggara Aquifer goes across disputed borders 
between Sudan and South Sudan - South Darfur, 
Kordofan States and Unity States.
BurundiRwanda
Chad LibyaSouth Sudan*
Kenya Tanzania
groundwater is missing in most of the political 
discourse. This issue might crop up in the future as 
dependence on an aquifer of one country might 
affect the groundwater levels of the other countries 
involved. Also, pollution by a country might affect the 
groundwater in the complete aquifer. 
Understanding the interaction between surface 
water and groundwater: It is essential to understand 
the overlap between the groundwater and surface 
water and their effects on each other. Surface water 
pollution may also lead to groundwater pollution. 
This has been noticed in Lake Victoria where polluted 
water from the lake had seeped in as groundwater 
which is of poor quality and unsuitable for drinking 
purposes. In the coastal regions this overlap may 
lead to high levels of salinity. Over abstraction of 
groundwater may lead to reduction in the surface 
water levels. For instance, surface water levels in Lake 
Alemaya in the Ethiopian highlands, are gradually 
declining due to over abstraction of groundwater in 
the adjoining aquifers. It is necessary to introduce 
trans-boundary laws to protect the quality of 
groundwater. Perhaps, this can be done under Article 
6 of CFA or under a new treaty on groundwater.
Political infrastructure of cooperation should be 5. 
created through parliamentarians and media 
networks.
The process of cooperation is often difficult for 
common citizens to comprehend. It is therefore not 
enough merely for governments to explore means of 
cooperation in the Nile Basin. It is important to create 
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a political infrastructure of cooperation by developing 
basin wide networks of parliamentarians and media 
persons. 
The parliamentarians represent people and work 
closely with governments. Some of them may even 
join governments at some stage. They have legislative 
authority to introduce and scrutinise bills. They have 
extraordinary access to ministers. These assets can be 
utilised in the interest of basin cooperation. Currently, 
NBI has established NBI Parliamentarians Forum. It 
had two meetings in the last 10 years. However, these 
meetings had a few parliamentarians and a large 
number of civil society and technical representatives. 
It is necessary to have a parliamentary network, 
which harnesses the specific strengths Members 
of Parliament have. Such a network should have 
Nile Parliamentary groups in national legislatures, 
which are linked through pro-active and interested 
members interaction, rather than the current practice 
of Speakers nominating a couple of members for an 
occasional meeting.
The media is another important constituent of 
political infrastructure of any country. There is already 
the Nile Media Network, which provides meeting 
space for journalists from Nile countries. Such a 
network needs to be sharpened and strengthened 
with emphasis on the following roles:
Agreements between governments and national 
media organisations for transparency and free flow 
of information to one another 
Creating awareness and sensitizing the citizens 
on water related issues which will increase 
their involvement and support to the cause of 
cooperation and improved governance
Increasing access to information regarding new 
technologies
Conscious efforts by media to promote 
investments in the water sector
Reaching agreement on reducing mutual hatred 
and hostile sentiments towards one another
Reaching agreement on not spreading rumours 
against one another
Exchange of media persons to check and verify 
facts related to issues of misunderstanding.
In case of the parliamentarians as well as the media, 
there is no need to reinvent the wheel. Existing 
organisations and networks can be strengthened and 
reoriented for better results.
In the long term, the Nile Basin countries can 6. 
aspire to develop regional cooperation with the 
Nile and its tributaries as a ‘regional common’. 
The Nile Basin countries can consider establishing 
Nile Regional Economic Community. Water is required 
for irrigation (agriculture), hydro-electric dams 
(industry), urbanisation, trade, transit and other 
economic needs. If cooperation in water is integrated 
into broader regional economic cooperation, it will be 
possible for parties to appreciate the development 
needs of one another.
The role of a Regional Economic Community (REC) 
in Africa has been such that it has helped to develop 
a level of trust between the countries by working 
towards economic as well as political integration. The 
Southern African Development Community (SADC) 
for example was established to focus on areas of 
“transport and communication, agriculture, energy 
and human development”. However, over the course 
of time, its role expanded into “attracting investment 
into natural resource management, sharing of energy, 
conflict resolution to cooperation”. SADC now has a 
mandate on Water.  In the case of SADC, REC was first 
established and the vision for water came later. In the 
case of Nile Basin, technical cooperation in the water 
sector has already been launched in the form of the 
Nile Basin Initiative but it can be expanded to cover 
other aspects of regional integration. Whether a 
region starts with water or adds water at a later stage 
in its continuum to evolve a process of cooperation, it 
is important to note that water is an integrated part 
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of regional economic dynamics, and not a resource to 
be utilised in isolation.
The Nile member countries are already members 
of two regional economic bodies. Countries such 
as D.R. Congo, Egypt, Ethiopia, Eritrea and Sudan 
are members of the Common Market for Eastern 
and Southern Africa (COMESA) while Tanzania is 
a member of the East African Community (EAC). 
Rwanda, Burundi, Kenya and Uganda are members 
of both the organizations with South Sudan expected 
to join soon. Thus, the Nile member countries have 
been positively disposed towards institutionalised 
economic cooperation in Africa. They can draw from 
their experience of the two organisations, or indeed 
their analysis of regional cooperation agreements 
in other parts of the world, to envisage, shape and 
structure regional economic cooperation agreement 
in the Nile Basin.
The main difference between the proposed Nile REC 
and COMESA and EAC is that the latter two, like SADC, 
are driven by trade and industry agenda, whereas 
the Nile REC could be driven by water cooperation 
agenda. 
Cooperation in water requires significant trade-offs. 
Shares of water can be negotiated in exchange for 
transit, hydro-electricity, agriculture and economic 
development opportunities. Cropping patterns can be 
developed on the basis of comparative advantage of 
natural resource endowment, supported by regional 
free trade in food and agricultural commodities. The 
Nile Basin countries should consider establishing a 
Regional Food Trade Network to formalise informal 
trade, reduce artificial food scarcity, create regional 
food buffer stocks, and facilitate judicious balance 
between food crops and cash crops, as well as 
drought-resistant crops and water-intensive crops 
on a regional basis. The NBI has already made 
small beginnings for regional power trade. The 
countries are negotiating power trade even outside 
the formal projects of NBI. Their willingness to 
explore this avenue demonstrates huge potential for 
cooperation, trade and joint investments in power 
sector. The countries can jointly develop eco-tourism 
opportunities. Once regional cooperation in water, 
hydro-electricity, tourism and agriculture grows, trans-
boundary cooperation in banking and communication 
will automatically expand. 
Such regional cooperation is only possible if the 
River Nile and its tributaries are treated as a Regional 
Common by all governments and people in the 
region. This will mean ensuring sustenance, quality 
and flow of the river in the best interest of all people 
and environment of the entire basin.
Component B- Domestic Governance and 
Efficiency of Water Sector
Cooperation in meteorological data management, 7. 
particularly for early warning of floods and 
drought has proved to be easy to achieve. 
It should be strengthened and extended to 
hydrometric data management as a confidence 
building measure.
First, the Eastern Nile region (primarily Egypt, 
Ethiopia, Sudan and South Sudan) has always been 
prone to extreme floods and droughts. Floods 
are commonplace between July-September, with 
devastating impact on urban centres. There is a good 
network of meteorological monitoring stations and 
practice of institutional cooperation with external 
space agencies at the national level in these countries. 
There is also good cooperation between them on 
early warning data management.
NBI’s Eastern Nile Technical Regional Office (ENTRO) 
in Addis Ababa is coordinating the Eastern Nile Flood 
Preparedness and Early Warning Project (FPEW) by 
facilitating meetings and information sharing sessions 
among the Blue Nile countries regarding river flows, 
flooding, flood risk maps, weather patterns and 
emergency preparedness. The objectives of the 
project are “to establish a regional institutional 
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basis; to strengthen the existing capacities of Eastern 
Nile countries in flood forecasting, mitigation and 
management; to promote regional cooperation and 
last but not the least, to enhance the readiness of 
Eastern Nile countries for implementation of the 
subsequent phases of the project.”
In the Lake Victoria Basin of the White Nile, there 
is Drought Monitoring Centre at Nairobi in Kenya. 
The functions of the centre include acquiring and 
managing climate data, monitoring, early warning of 
extreme climate events, capacity-building, information 
sharing, and creating new tools, among others.  
Despite the existence of institutional infrastructure in 
Blue and White Nile areas, and extensive cooperation 
with international organisations both floods and 
droughts occur regularly with large scale impact on 
people and environment. It is therefore necessary to 
improve the efficiency and coordination of the existing 
data centres and ensure their effective use for the 
benefit of people through community participation in 
their work and legislative support for this sector. 
Second, it is necessary to develop similar national 
networks and cooperation in data management with 
regards to hydrometric monitoring stations, including 
both quantitative and qualitative data on water 
resources. Currently, there is active cooperation 
between Egypt, Sudan and South Sudan with a large 
network of hydrometric stations managed by Egypt. 
This needs to be extended to other countries. As the 
first step, it is necessary to prepare a status report on 
the current hydrometric monitoring capacity of the 
Nile Basin, identifying specific deficiencies and 
proposing ways to address them.  Since cooperation 
in quality monitoring requires special effort, this 
issue is treated separately as an independent 
recommendation.
All efforts should be made to augment 8. 
steady and reliable sources of water through 
canals mitigating effects of evaporation and 
evapo-transpiration. Waste water treatment, 
reforestation, watershed development and other 
techniques that are environmentally sustainable 
should be promoted.
First, augmentation of water by reducing effects of 
evaporation and seepage should be explored. A large 
quantity of water gets evaporated or lost in seepage 
in the swamps in the Republic of South Sudan and 
Sudan. Supply-side proposals to create 18 BCM of 
additional water are already under discussion.
Jonglei Canal Project: Stage 1-4 BCM, 
Stage 2-3 BCM
Bahr El Ghazal Project: 7 BCM
Machar Project: 4.4 BCM
These proposals need further examination. If they 
can add value, their implementation needs to be 
expedited. However, it is also important that the 
issues of bio-diversity preservation and environmental 
sustainability are adequately addressed. Since both 
the implementation and non-implementation of these 
proposals carries heavy opportunity costs, a decision 
that balances human, social, economic and ecological 
interests needs to be taken by the countries directly 
involved in the projects.
Second, reuse of water, rainwater harvesting and 
treatment of waste water needs to be explored. The 
reuse of water in agriculture is already practised 
in some parts of the basin. The expansion of this 
technique across the basin can be examined. Waste 
water treatment has maximum scope in industrial 
and urban areas. Also, in industrial and urban 
settings capturing and harvesting of rain water can be 
explored, as being increasingly practised in different 
parts of the world. Rainwater harvesting is particularly 
relevant in the Nile Basin because of seasonal 
nature of rain in many parts of the basin. Rainwater 
harvesting can be done at a small level in housing 
societies in cities or at a larger level by communities.
Third, in coastal areas small and solar run 
desalination and brackish water conversion plants 
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can be established. There is a fascination for large 
desalination plants in some parts of the world and the 
Nile Basin countries might be tempted to purchase 
them but this option has limited application due to 
heavy financial and environmental costs. It may be 
possible to establish small plants for desalination 
or treatment of brackish water which run on solar 
energy. This can help overcome financial and 
environmental challenges. 
Fourth, reforestation can help raise the level of 
ground water. In the Nile Basin deforestation is taking 
place at a fast pace, obviously varying from one place 
to another. It is important to undertake reforestation 
on a large scale. Nile Basin needs a coordinated 
reforestation policy.
Fifth, well designed soil water conservation strategies 
are required. They should encourage participation of 
farmers through associations of small farmers. Care 
must be taken to construct right kind of bunds as per 
the density of rainfall. Vegetation, ground cover and 
check dams should be used where appropriate. 
Sixth, systematic watershed development can help 
augment water resources for agriculture. There are 
many techniques of watershed development. 
It is important to assess which specific technique 
would be optimal for a particular district, depending 
on the type of soil, terrain, rainfall and other factors. 
It would be helpful for each Nile country to develop 
a systematic watershed development strategy and 
determine most relevant techniques.
All efforts should be made to improve efficiency 9. 
and governance of the water sector, particularly 
on the demand side, in individual countries – 
since domestic actions have an impact on overall 
water resource balance of the Nile Basin.
First, it is important to improve water efficiency of 
agriculture and rural areas since agriculture is the 
main consumer of water in the Nile Basin as in most 
developing countries. This can be done in various 
ways, including the following:
Understand water deficits arising from higher 
evapotranspiration than precipitation. For 
instance Rwanda’s Irrigation Master Plan studied 
the relationship between precipitation and 
evapotranspiration (P/PET) in order to determine 
areas with higher evaporation which would require 
irrigation projects for agricultural expansion 
in order to find the most viable uses of these 
projects
Use ‘Water Footprint’ concept as a tool to 
calculate real water use in agriculture (and also 
for industrial as well as commercial use). The tool 
helps to determine economic costs of efficient 
and inefficient water use. Determine whether 
water footprint calculated is environmentally and 
economically sustainable in the long run
Construct anti-salinity barrages to improve the 
quality of water in the river
Use drip irrigation wherever possible
Maximise the use of drought-resistant crops, such 
as drought-resistant maize and rice developed in 
developing countries.
Second, it is important to reduce the unaccounted 
for water particularly in industry and urban areas. In 
several countries in the Nile Basin, significant portion 
of water is lost in conveyance. These include pipeline 
leakages, irrigation leakages as well as thefts. It is 
difficult to obtain reliable statistics of conveyance 
losses, which range from 30 to 50 per cent in different 
cities in different countries in the Basin.
In some countries water thefts have increased since 
the drought of 2011. For instance, disconnections 
of water pipes by thieves who collect and sell water, 
mugging and some petty thefts of water have 
become common occurrences in urban slums which 
lack sufficient access to piped water. As water theft 
is viewed as a petty offense, there is little judicial 
consequence of these actions. 
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Thus, improvement of water infrastructure to improve 
demand management will also require: 
Setting up water efficiency standards for water 
supply systems and industrial sector 
Upgrading and modernizing water supply and 
distribution systems particularly as a buffer during 
droughts and periods of water scarcity
Improving energy efficiency in water pumping for 
urban domestic pipelines
Minimizing non-revenue water such as controlling 
illegal connections, conveyance losses, unbilled 
water connections. In major cities with pipelines 
suffering from undetected leaks, the installation of 
remote sensing technologies to detect leaks could 
go a long way in reducing water losses 
Encouraging partnership between the government, 
municipal authorities and the civil society in order 
to increase community’s water efficiency and 
security as well as food security. 
Third, the Nile Basin countries will need to address 
the difficult and unpopular subject of water pricing 
and draw their own conclusions which are socially, 
economically and politically sustainable.
The Nile Basin countries should learn from 10. 
successful examples of other countries in Africa 
and elsewhere in the world and adapt best 
practices to their specific requirements.
The experience of other countries in water 
governance, conservation, river restoration, quality 
control, and River Basin management systems in 
Africa, as well as elsewhere in the world would be 
of help to the Nile River countries to expand their 
knowhow and enhance capacity to respond to their 
challenges collectively and constructively.
The Nile Basin Initiative in the past has undertaken 
a ‘knowledge exchange study tour’ to the Senegal 
River Basin to learn the role of the Senegal River 
basin organization (OMVS) and identify certain best 
practices.
The Nile Basin countries may use the auspices of 
African Ministerial Council on Water or International 
Network of Basin Organisations to establish access to 
some of the countries and basins where they wish to 
undertake learning journeys.
They may also directly approach countries and regions 
known for best practices in different aspects of 
national governance or trans-boundary cooperation 
of water. For instance:
Senegal River for trans-boundary water 
management
Rhine River for trans-boundary water management
Southern African Development Community for 
regional cooperation principles 
European Union (in context of Directive Framework 
60) for cooperation in quality control
South Korea for restoration of rivers
Singapore for urban water management and waste 
water treatment
Indus Water Commission for arbitration 
mechanism in case of disputes
Israel for drip irrigation and mitigation of 
conveyance losses
Mekong for cooperation in data management.
Many of the examples cited above are from 
developing countries. It is possible to consider other 
examples from which the Nile countries can benefit. It 
would be also helpful to learn about new technologies 
– in particular those using solar energy – in various 
aspects of water management.
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Process for Enhanced Cooperation
Immediate
Short & Medium Term
Medium Term
Long Term
Informal Meeting of Nile Ministers of Foreign Affairs and Water 
Regional Economic Cooperation with Nile Basin as the basis  
Creation of:
• High Strategic Council
• Committee of Legal Experts
• Quality Control Committee
Restructuring of:
• Parliamentary Forum
• Media Network
Groundwater Cooperation 
and Conflict Prevention
• Cooperation in Data 
   Management
• Early Warning of Floods and 
   Droughts 
• Learning from Other Basins
• Waste Water Treatment, 
   Reforestation, Watershed 
   Development
• Efficiency in Water 
   Governance
Po
liti
ca
l
Po
liti
ca
l
Te
ch
nic
al
Te
ch
nic
al
Discharge Scheme in the Nile Basin
Backgrounder
Euphrates
Tigris
Nile
Blue Nile
Dind
er
Wahad
W
hite Nile
Wad
i el 
Milk
Wa
di 
el G
hal
la
Atbara
Sobat
Bahr el Arab
Su
e
Wa
u
Jur
Wa
di H
owar
Shebelle
Ju
bb
a
Tana
Omo
Ko
tto
Uele
Aruwimi
Mbom
ou
Ubangi
Congo
Lom
ami
Tshuapa
Sankuru
Lowa
Congo
Nile
Kyoga
Lagh Bor
Lake Nasser
Lake Tana
Lake Turkana
Lake
Albert
Lake
Kyoga
Lake
Edward
Lake Kivu
Lake Victoria
Lake
Tanganyika
Lake Eyasi
Lake
Abaya
Baraka
R       e       d               S       e       a
I  n  d  i  a  n
O  c  e  a  n
M e d i t e r r a n e a n     S e a
Victoria
Nile
Ruvuvu
Nyabarongo
Kagera
Bahr el
Ghazal
Akobo
Baro
Pibor
Kuwait City
Najaf
Basra
Nasiriyah
AhvazTel Aviv
Irbid
Haifa
Jerusalem Amman
Damascus
Cairo
Port Said
Suez
Beni Suef
Qena
Alexandria
Benghazi
Aswan
Jeddah Mecca
Abha
Al Hudaydah
Massawa
Mekele Taizz
Assab
Medina
Buraydah
Riyadh
Sanaa
Aden
Hargeisa
Berbera
Dire Dawa
Nazret
Djibouti
D J I B O U T I
Asmara
Port Sudan
Khartoum
Wad Medani
El Obeid
Wau
Addis Abeba
Mogadishu
Nairobi
Juba
Kampala
Kigali
Bujumbura
Mwanza
Arusha
NakuruKisumu
Mombasa
Kismayo
Bukavu
Kindu
Kisangani
I     R     A     Q
J O R D A N
S Y R I A
ISRAEL
E   G   Y   P   T
L I B Y A
S   U   D   A   N
S O U T H E R N
S U D A N
E  T  H  I  O  P  I  A
E R I T R E A
Y E M E N
S A U D I    A R A B I A
S O M A L I A
S O M A L I A
K   E   N   Y   A
T  A  N  Z  A  N  I  A
C   O   N   G   O
CENTRAL AFRICAN
REPUBLIC
RWANDA
BURUNDI
U G A N D A
C H A D
I R A N
K U W A I TS i n a i
S u d d
Marra Plateau
H    e    j    a    z
S     a     h     a     r     a
2.5
2.9
7.3
7.5 2750
39.5
280 27
38.9
36
16
13.5
14.3
Jonglei Canal
(projected)
29.6
28.4
2.5
48.3
9.8
88
72.7
72.3
13.7
1
3.4
28.6
Aswan
Dam 84.1
New Valley Project
2nd Cataract
3rd Cataract
4th Cataract
5th Cataract
Roseires
Dam 49.8
Nalubaale 
Dam 34.2
100 200 300 400 km0
Map produced by ZOÏ Environment Network, March 2012
Annual mean discharge in km³
5 10 20
50
100
22 Backgrounder
Country 
 
 
Rwanda 
 
Burundi 
 
Tanzania 
 
Kenya 
 
 
 
Democratic Republic 
of Congo (DRC 
Uganda 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Eritrea 
 
Ethiopia 
 
Sudan + South 
Sudan
 
Egypt
Water to Non-Nile Basin 
(Internal and trans-boundary 
river basins) 
(BCM/yr)
6.03 
(Congo basin, internal 
sources)
9.17 
(Congo Basin, internal 
sources)
90.27 
(Congo basin, internal river 
basins)
11.08 
(internal, sources) + 
10 
(from Ethiopia’s Omo-Gibe 
basin)
1,280.8 
(Congo Basin) 
- 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5.7 
 
49.01 
16.1 –to Omo-Gibe Basin 
30.9– internal sources
- 
 
16 
(reuse of water)
Nile Share in Total Water 
(BCM/yr) 
 
3.47 
 
3.37 
 
6 
 
9.62 
(including Mara River, 
Kenya/Tanzania) 
 
2.19 
(to Semlike) 
29.48 
to Victoria Nile 
(4.83 - Uganda torrents 
to Lakes) + (Contribution 
from DRC, Kenya, 
Tanzania, Rwanda, 
Burundi = 24.65) 
36.52 
(retained in Uganda)
0.6 
(from Tekeze) 
72.99 
 
- 34.96 (retention in the 
Sudd and evaporation)
57 (to Egypt)
57.04 (retained in Sudan 
and South Sudan)
57
Total Renewable Water Resources 
(BCM/yr) 
 
9.5 
SW = 9.5  
GW = 7 (overlap of 7)
12.54 
SW = 12.54 
GW = 7.47 (overlap of 7.47)
96.27 
SW = 92.27 
GW = 30 (overlap of 26)
30.7 
SW = 30.2 
GW = 3.5 (overlap of 3)
 
 
1,283 
SW = 1,282 
GW = 421 (overlap of 420)
66 
SW = 66 
GW = 29 (overlap of 29) 
 
 
 
 
 
6.3 
SW = 6.2 
GW = 0.5 (overlap of 0.4)
122 
SW = 120 
GW = 20 (overlap of 18)
149 
(Internal = 64.5) 
SW = 84.5 + 62.5 
GW = 7 (overlap of 5)
 
57 
SW = 55.5 
GW = 1.5
Water Resources of Nile Countries
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Changing Population and Availability of Water
* There are limitations of using per capita availability of water in discerning future water availability
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Per capita availability is generally calculated by 
dividing total annual renewable water resources with 
population. While this could provide an accurate 
picture for countries with no dependency on external 
water resources, it does not provide an accurate 
depiction for countries with trans-boundary water 
resources. Taking into account the dependency ratio 
of the countries provides a much more realistic 
depiction of future water resources. For instance, 
Uganda has a 40.9 per cent dependency ratio for its 
total annual renewable water resources (Rwanda, 
Burundi, Tanzania, DRC and Kenya contribute runoff 
into Lake Victoria). This will be impacted when 
increased water demand in upstream nations results 
in reduced water runoffs into Uganda. Egypt which 
originally had a 98 per cent dependency ratio has 
been able to bring down its dependency by increasing 
alternate water resources but still has a 76 per cent 
dependency ratio (55.5 BCM out of 73 BCM).
GDP Growth
Note: Annual Growth Rate of 7 per cent for 2030 has been used as it is a foreseeable sustainable rate of economic growth in 
the region.
5.1
Burundi Tanzania Kenya DRC Uganda Eritrea Ethiopia EgyptRwanda Sudan + 
South Sudan
5.6 21.67 7.74
88.62
124.22
50.69 66.17
8.13
114.54
258.88
847.07
2.0 22.9
32.1 13.1 17.1 2.1
29.6
66.9
218.9
4.5
9.95.67
3.87.2 7.2 5.9 2.2
Burundi Tanzania Kenya DRC Uganda Eritrea Ethiopia EgyptRwanda Sudan + 
South Sudan
529
242
527
795
199
515 403 358
1,538
2,698
GDP per capita (in USD) in 2010
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* Figures for industry not available.
Water Withdrawals (BMC/yr)
Rwanda
9.5
0.2
0.136
0.016
0.048
Burundi
12.54
0.3
0.231
0.018
0.051
Uganda
Sudan + South Sudan
Egypt
Eritrea* Ethiopia*
66
6.3
0.3
149
(internal = 64.5)
37.1
0.6
0.57
0.03
122
5.6
5.264
0.336
Tanzania*
96.27
5.2
4.628
0.52
Kenya
30.7
2.7
2.133
0.459
0.108
35.987
0.3710.742
57
62.784.38
5.84
73
(agricultural re-use 
and desalinated water)
0.1080.12
1,283
0.6
DRC
0.378
0.108
0.054
0.138
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Population and Area of the Riparian Countries in the Nile River Basin
Area (1000k
m
2 ) in
 th
e N
ile
 B
as
in
8.4 5.1
9.3
16.1
2.6
33.6
231.3
365.1
1,978.5
326.7
19.8
13.2 46.2
22.1
24.9
84.2
1.6
34.1
38.7
82.9
Rwanda
Burundi
Tanzania
Kenya
DRC
Uganda
Eritrea
Ethiopia
Sudan + South Sudan
Egypt
